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"God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!":
Freedom of Religion in the Post-modern Age
Michael W. ~ c C o n n e l r
In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche, the fountainhead
of post-modernism, tells of a madman who on a bright morning
lights a lantern and runs t o the marketplace proclaiming "God
is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! . . . There
never was a greater event,-and on account of it, all who are
born after us belong to a higher history than any history
hitherto!"' The effect was powerful. For those capable of
understanding, "some sun seem[ed] to have set, some old,
profound confidence seem[ed] t o have changed into doubt.'" In
Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche's mythic hero carries the
same message-"God is dead!"-throughout the earth, in a
parody of the gospels: calling it his "gift" to mankindO4But
there is one exception. The book begins with an encounter
between Zarathustra and a holy man living alone in the forest.
Zarathustra asks the hermit what he does in the forest, and
the hermit replies: "I make hymns and sing them; and in
making hymns I laugh and weep and mumble: thus do I praise
God. With singing, weeping, laughing, and mumbling do I
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1. FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE,JOYFUL
WISDOM167-68 (Thomas Common trans.,
1960). The title is usually translated as The Gay Science.
2. Id. at 275.
3.
Zarathustra, like Christ, leaves his home when he is thirty years old, goes
into the mountains in solitude, and then begins to sojourn among the people
preaching the truth about God.
4.
FRIEDRICH
N I ~ S C H ETHUS
,
SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA
5 (Thomas Common
trans., Modern Library ed. 1970).
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praise the God who is my God.775The hermit then asks
Zarathustra what he had brought as a "gift." Zarathustra,
surprisingly, does not take up this invitation to tell the hermit
the terrible truth of the death of God. Instead he says,
evasively, 'What should I have to give thee! Let me rather
hurry hence lest I take aught away from thee!" And
Zarathustra leaves the old man to worship in peace.
This is the story of religious freedom in the post-modern
world.
The first thing we notice about the story is the
extraordinary gentleness with which Zarathustra treated the
holy man. This is startlingly out of character for a philosopher
who celebrates strength and derides mercy, who tells
unflinchingly the hard truths and has no respect for those so
weak that they must take refuge in comfortable lies and
superstitions. Nowhere else in Zarathustra does the hero spare
the sensibilities of his hearers. Nietzsche thus suggests that
there is something different about the holy man. While for
most men, word of the death of God is a "gift," for the saint it
would "take away" something precious. And in like manner, the
post-modern world is willing to leave the believer in peace.
Religious belief, we realize, is precious to those who have it,
and it would be pointless and mean to interfere with it.
But what we notice next about the story is that the hermit
was quaint and wrong. He was behind the times. He simply
had not gotten the word. When Zarathustra was alone,
Nietzsche tells us that he marvelled to himself, "Could it be
possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it,
that God is dead!"' Zarathustra's forbearance was not based on
any respect for the possible truth of the saint's beliefs.
Zarathustra did not entertain that possibility. He could not.
God is dead. You cannot argue with facts. His forbearance was
an act of kindness, a n indulgence-not the product of a mind
open to the possibility that the other possesses a truth.
The third point we notice about the story is that it involves
a hermit, living by himself in the forest. He did not preach or
proclaim the word of God. He did not go into the village. He
sang, laughed, wept, and-most revealingly-"mumbled," but
these inarticulate sounds did not communicate. Zarathustra's
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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toleration was toward 'one who neither participated in public
life nor entered public discourse. No such forbearance was
shown to anyone in the village. If the hermit left the forest and
attempted to enter into public discussion and debate, he would
be given the news of God's death like everyone else.
Can we recognize in Zarathustra the enlightened attitude
toward religious faith in our age? Religious freedom is to be
protected, strongly protected-so long as it is irrelevant to the
life of the wider community. But allow religion to affect the law
pertaining to, say, abortion; or allow religion to affect the way
we educate our children i n our communities' schools; even
allow religion to affect the way we celebrate holidays in public,
and there is trouble. When these quaint and discredited beliefs
spill over into the life of the community, we have crossed the
line. Religion, the Supreme Court has told us on more than one
occasion, is "a private matter for the individual, the family, and
the institutions of private choice." Religion in public is at best
a breach of etiquette, at worst a violation of the law. Religion is
privatized and marginalized. It has nothing to offer to the
public sphere. We will not interfere with solitary hermits in the
forest, but they must stay out of the public square.
Lest this characterization be viewed as a caricature,
consider a brief recently filed by the respected Attorney
General of the State of New York, Robert Abrams. The case
involved the State's refusal to allow a religious group to use a
public meeting room to show a religiously-oriented film about
child rearing, even though these facilities were open by law to
The
any "use[] pertaining to the welfare of the comm~nity."~
group claimed this violated their freedom of speech, but the
Attorney General defended the exclusion by arguing that
[ulnlike the community purposes for which authority is
designated in the statute, religion is an "individual
experience," that is "inviolately private." Religion "must be a
private matter for the individual." Religious advocacy, like
petitioners' effort to persuade community residents to
"instill[]" "Christian values" in their children ''from an early
age," serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents
and yields a benefit only to those who already believe.''

8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
9. N.Y.EDUC.LAW 414(1Xc) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
10. Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024) (citations
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In other words, religion is "private" and religiously informed
opinion of no public benefit.
I t is inconceivable that a public official would say that
about any other worldview. If feminists, gay-rights activists,
Afro-centrists, or even secular conservatives tried to
communicate their ideas about child rearing to the public,
Abrams would never say they should keep their ideas to
themselves, o r that their ideas "yield a benefit only to those
who already believe." In a n open society, we presume that the
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"" exchange of viewpoints
benefits us all.
We do not yet live in the post-modern world; perhaps we
never will. It is heartening that Abrams's argument was
rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court. Many millions of
Americans find the meaning of life in their churches and
synagogues, through their religious traditions, and in personal
encounters with their God. Religion has not been confined to
the purely private, but informs discussions of justice and
provides a framework for community. Unsecular America has
not lost its voice. But in most of academia, and i n many walks
of life dominated by the secular elite, the news of the death of
God has been taken to heart and the voice of religion is all but
silenced. We live in an age when previously marginalized
voices are welcomed to the public dialogue. But religion,
somehow, is different. Religion must be kept under wraps. This
essay is a diagnosis, and a warning-and perhaps also a plea
for old-fashioned broadmindedness.
11. EARLYLIBERALISM
AND THE FREEDOM
OF RELIGION

To talk about post-modernism requires us first to talk
about modernism. And to talk about modernism is to talk
about 'liberalism," which is modernism's politics. Liberalism is
the doctrine (or family of doctrines) that places individual
freedom a t the center of political aspiration. For the most part,
the liberalism we see today is secular liberalism. We tend to
forget that liberalism was born of concerns about religion.
Virtually all the great political thinkers of the formative stage
of liberalism-Hobbes, Bodin, Spinoza, Bacon, Hooker, Milton,
omitted). After this article was prepared, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the Attorney General's argument. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148-49.
11. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.254, 270 (1964).
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Sidney, Locke, Hume, Bayle, Voltaire, Montesquieu,
Montaigne, Smith, Burke, and Rousseau, not to mention more
obviously "religious" figures like Calvin, Luther, More, and
Erasmus-grappled with the issues of religion and government.
Liberalism came about when and where it did because the
Protestant Reformation made the individual believer the judge
of religious truth ("God Alone is Lord of the Conscience") and
thus made freedom of thought a pressing question for all
thinking individuals.12 Religion and religious freedom were
therefore at the very heart of the liberal project. Liberalism
meant many things, but above all it meant that every person
has the freedom to worship God in accordance with the dictates
of his own conscience. This was the key to achieving both
freedom of the mind and civil peace.
Initially, liberalism was understood principally in terms of
what we would now call 'limited government": government
must be confined to certain limited ends and the rest would be
left to private persons in the private sphere.13 As applied to
religion, this meant that the magistrate was given no power to
superintend the spiritual health of the citizens. As applied to
the economic sphere, this would lead to the belief in a freemarket economy; but it is important to realize that the
implications of liberalism for religion were older than-and
philosophically prior to-the realization of its implications for
economics. Milton and Locke developed sophisticated theories
of religious freedom more than a century before Adam Smith
brought us the theory of the free market.
Liberalism was favorably received, especially on this side
of the Atlantic, in part because of its consistency with two
central teachings of Protestant Christianity.14 The first of
these is the two-kingdoms theology of Augustinian t h o u g h t a

12.
Of course, there are many other factors that contributed to the rise of
liberalism. For example, the ensuing diversity of beliefs resulting from the
Protestant Reformation also gave rise to ruinous religious conflicts in most of the
European nations of the seventeenth century. My intention here is not to provide a
comprehensive intellectual history, but to call attention to the close connection
between liberalism and the question of religion.
THE SECONDTREATISEOF CML
13. The classic text is JOHNUCKE,
GOVERNMENT
(J.W. Gough ed. 1956) (1690). See particularly chapter M,at 63-66.
14.
On the co~ectionsbetween Protestant religious developments and religious
toleration in Britain and the States, see W
m R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION
WITHIN
THE REVOLUTION
(1990), and MICHAELR. WATTS,THE DISSENTERS:FROMTHE
REFORMATION
TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
(1978). See also WILLIAM G.
MCLOUGHLIN,
NEW ENGLAND
DISSENT:1630-1833 (1971).
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theology carried forward in different ways by Luther and by
the Calvinist Reformed tradition to which our Puritan and
Presbyterian forebears adhered.15 The two-kingdoms theology
conceived of man as owing allegiance to two different sets of
authorities, the spiritual and the temporal. "God has appointed
two kinds of government in the world,"16 explained Isaac
Backus, a Baptist leader and one of the most influential
advocates of religious freedom at the Founding. These
governments "are distinct in their nature, and ought never to
be confounded together; one of -which is called civil, the other
ecclesiastical government."" Religious freedom, in this view,
involved the jurisdictional separation of these two sets of
authorities. Connecticut preacher Elisha Williams drew an
analogy to one king attempting to govern the people of another
kingdom:
[Ilf CHRIST be the Lord of the conscience, the sole King in his
own kingdom; then it will follow, that all such as in any
manner or degree assume the power of directing and
governing the consciences of men, are justly chargeable with
invading his rightful dominion; He alone having the right
they claim. Should the king of France take it into his head to
prescribe laws to the subjects of the king of Great Britain;
who would not say, it was an invasion of and insult offer'd to
the British legi~lature.'~

The state should thus confine itself t o matters of worldly
concern, so as not t o invade the province of the spiritual
sovereign.lg
While theological in its origin, the two-kingdoms idea lent

15.
See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 376-77 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950); 2
JOHN
CALVIN, I N S T ~ EOSF THE CHRISTIANRELIGION184 (Ford L. Battle ed. &
trans., 1975); 45 MARTINLUTHER,Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should
Be Obeyed, in LUTHER'S WORKS75, 81-129 (Walther I. Brandt ed. & J.J. Schindel
A NATION
trans., 1962); see generally ARLIN M. ADAMS& CHARLESJ. EMMERICH,

3, 56-57 (1990).
DEDICATED
TO RELIGIOUSLIBERTY
16.
ISAACBACKUS,AN APPEALTO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUSLIBERTY(1773),
reprinted in POLITICALSERMONSOF THE AMERICANFOUNDINGERA 334 (Ellis
Sandoz ed., 1991) [hereinafter POLITICAL
SERMONS].
Id. at 335.
17.
ELISHAWILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL R I G ~ AND
S
LIBERTIESO F PROTESTANTS
18.
(1744), reprinted in POLITICALSERMONS,
supra note 16, a t 51, 65-66.
19.
Locke defends a similar position in his Letters on Religious Tolemtwn,
though primarily in the interest of civil harmony. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1430-35 (1990).
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powerful support to a more general liberal theory of
government, because once the government could be limited in
one respect, it could be limited in others. The state could no
longer be understood as omnicompetent. This idea provided
probably the most important counterweight to the common
Enlightenment belief that the best form of government was
enlightened despotism. It can be argued that of the two great
intellectual upheavals of the early modern period, the
Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, the latter was
the more signdkant for the advance of political liberty. Of
course, much blood was spilled for conscience-not least by,
Protestants-before these implications of Protestant doctrine
became apparent and ultimately dominant.
The two-kingdoms view of competing authorities is at the
heart of our First Amendment. The first paragraph of the most
important document explaining the Founders' conception of
religious freedom, J a m e s Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reasons as
follows: "It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to
him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of
obligation, t o the claims of Civil S o ~ i e t y . "So
~ ~we have duties
to God, and duties to civil society, and the duties to God are
precedent both in time and also in importance. Madison
continued:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of
the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters
into any subordinate Association, must also do it with a
reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more
must every man who becomes a member of any particular
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal So~ereign.~'

Here we see the confluence of Lockean social contract theory
and two-kingdoms theology: Madison understands the civil
authority as constituted by consent of the governed and the
spiritual authority as ordained by the Universal Sovereign.

20.
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCEAGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS
5 1 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1, 64
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).

21.

Id.
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Significantly, Madison gives precedence to the latter over the
former. Religious freedom is both necessary and inalienable
because it follows from the duties owed to God by His
creatures. Indeed, religion is defined in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights as "the duty which we owe to our
C r e a t ~ r . "Men
~ ~ have no right to consent to civil government
that would stand in the way of their duties to the Universal
Sovereign. "It would be sinful for a man to surrender that to
man which is to be kept sacred for God," according to Madison's
constituent, the Baptist leader John Leland.23
The second theological notion that paved the way for
liberalism was the emerging concept of what the Baptists
called "soul liberty." This is the belief that faith, to be valid and
acceptable t o God, must be uncoerced. Under this view, it is
literally impossible as a theological matter for government
power to improve a citizen's spiritual state. In the words of
Elisha Williams:
,

That faith and practice which depends on the judgment and
choice of any other person, and not on the person's own
understanding judgment and choice, may pass for religion in
the synagogue of Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance is the
mother of devotion; but with no understanding Protestant will
it pass for any religion at all. No action is a religious action
without understanding and choice in the agent.24

The idea of soul liberty derives from the doctrine of salvation
through grace: the only way that unregenerate man can come
to faith and salvation is through the intervention of God. It is
worse than useless-it is blasphemous-for a n outside party,
the government for example, to presume to supplant the free
act of God.25
22.
VIRGINIADECLARATION
OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICANHIS~ORY103, 104 (Henry S. Commager ed., 9th ed.
1973).
JOHN LELAND,THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCEINALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in
23.
POLITICALSERMONS,supra note 16, at 1079, 1085. For an account of Leland's
critical role in persuading Madison to sponsor a religious freedom provision in a
Bill of Rights, see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A
Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 323-24.
WILLIAMS,supra note 18, at 62. This is only one of numerous sermons and
24.
religious tracts making a similar point.
Tbis is closely associated in Protestant doctrine with the idea that God's
25.
revelation to man through the scriptures is perfect and accessible to all, and
should be the sole authority for faith and practice. Thus, Elisha Williams
maintained that
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. The soul liberty doctrine is reflected in the foundational
documents of the First Amendment. It is revealing that the
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, authored by
Thomas Jefferson and shepherded through the General
Assembly by James Madison, begins with a theological
proposition:
Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits
of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the
plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both
of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions
on either . . . .26

God created the mind free; though being "Lord of body and
mind," He chose not to propagate faith through coercion;
attempts to influence religious faith through government power
are inconsistent with God's plan; a coerced faith is invalid and
unacceptable to God-these are not secular arguments. The
pen may have been Jefferson's but the content came from the
revival tents of Baptist enthusiasts; the Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom is based on Protestant doctrine.
The soul liberty idea also paved the way for a broader
conception of liberalism. Just as the two-kingdoms theology
points in the direction of limited government, the doctrine of
soul liberty implies and leads to liberty in general, or to the
"pursuit of Happiness," as it is put in the Declaration of
Independen~e.~'
In other words, each person is free to pursue
the good life in the manner and season most agreeable to his or
her conscience, which is the voice of God. If God did not
exercise His omnipotent power to coerce Adam and Eve to live
according to His precepts, He must have wanted mankind to be
free creatures. Surely no earthly authority has a better claim to
rule than God Himself. It is no accident that peoples who

it is impossible to be true that any can have right or authority to oblige
Christians to' believe or practice any thing in religion not true or not
agreeable to the word of GOD: Because that would destroy the sacred
scriptures from being the only rule of faith and practice in religion to a
Christian.
Id. at 73.
26.
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty 5 1 (1786), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICANHISTORY, supm note 22, at 125.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (US.1776).
27.
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accepted Protestant theology were the first to accept liberal
political theory. No one would have said that liberalism a t the
time of the Founding was inconsistent with or hostile to
religious freedom, for religious freedom was one of its principal
commitments and preoccupations.
111. MODERNLIBERALISM
AND FREEDOM
OF RELIGION
At its beginning, then, liberalism was intellectually
connected t o religious thought and strongly supportive of
religious freedom. But matters did not stay that way. As
liberalism developed, it departed from its religious roots. Three
particular developments had especially important implications
for religious freedom.

A. Liberalism As Ideology
The first is that liberalism, understood as limited government, gave way to liberalism understood as an ideology-the
advocacy of a particular way of life. A liberal regime requires
liberal citizens. Liberal citizens are those with liberal virtues.
What are the liberal virtues? There are a number of answers
that could be given to this question:8 but among them, surely,
are the virtues of individualism, independence, and rationality.
It is not my intention t o criticize individualism, independence,
or rationality, all of which, properly understood, can be excellences of the human being as well as of the liberal citizen. But
like all human characteristics, they are susceptible to misunderstanding and distortion, and so misunderstood these three
virtues are in tension with the religious way of life.
Religion is typically more communitarian than individualistic. It calls for a transcending of self. The good life, seen
through the eyes of biblical religion, is one of mutual obligation
and submission. The commandment is to love God, and to love
your neighbor as yourself;zg the last will be first:'
and t o
lose one's life is to find it.31 Individualism can be threatening
to the religious sensibility because-understood in a particular
way-it can foster and legitimate selfishness, self-love, even

28.

See the various answers given in the essays in VIRTUE(John W. Chapman

& William A. Galston eds., Nomos XXXIV, 1992).

29.
30.
31.

Luke 10:27.
Matthew 19:30.
Matthew 10:39.
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self-worship. The idea of independence or autonomy, similarly,
can conflict with the conviction that we do not choose but we
are chosen by God, whose law governs the universe. It is closely akin to pride, which is the deadliest of the theological vices.
Autonomy, too, can become a perversion of conscience: conscience is the ability and responsibility of each individual to
conform to the dictates of the moral order, while autonomy
requires conformity to no one but oneself. And rationalism can
easily be understood as opposed to faith and tradition. It can
degenerate into skepticism and nihilism, the ultimate irrationality.
From a secular point of view, it is difficult t o appreciate
the religious impulse. Faith seems antithetical t o reason and
obedience t o higher authority seems submissive and antidemocratic. A liberalism based on individualism, independence, and
rationalism thus has a tendency t o see traditional religion as
authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-as a potential threat t o
our democratic institution^^^ rather than as one of their stur.~~
diest pillars, as was typically thought at the F ~ u n d i n g Today, it is not unusual to find law professors writing that religions "undermine rather than mutually reinforce habits of
mind necessary for democratic decision-making,"34or that religion is "fundamentally incompatible with [the] intellectual
cornerstone of the modern democratic state."35 Justice John
Paul Stevens has called religions "divisive forces" and told us
that it is vital to keep these forces out of our public
schools-even when the religious activity in question is voluntary, extracurricular, and student-initiated.36This, he says, is
because the schools are "the symbol of our democracy and the

For a particularly forthright statement of this view, see William P. Mar32.
L.J. 843 (1993).
shall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS
33.
See, e.g., ALEXISDE TOCQUEMLLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA293 (J.P. Mayer
ed., 1969) (reporting that Americans considered religion "necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions" and that he had come to agree with them);
WASHINGTON'S
FAREWELL
ADDRESS(Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS
OF
AMERICAN
HISTORY,supra note 22, at 169, 173 (religion is the "indispensable support[]" for republican government).
34.
Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discriminatory Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 598 (1991).
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation
35.
of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. F'I'IT. L. REV.
75, 174 (1990).
Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226, 287 (1990)
36.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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most pervasive means of promoting our common destiny."37
Needless to say, modem liberals see no need to keep other
"divisive forces" out of the schools. Indeed they are the first to
protest "censorship" when Soul on Ice or books containing vulgar and offensive language are removed from the curricu1
~
~
.
~
~
With such a change in perspective, freedom of religion
came to be seen as less important than freedom from religion.
I t is revealing that Felix Frankfurter, the prototypical liberal of
this school, described religious freedom as "freedom from conformity to religious dogma,"39 and Justice Harry Blackmun
describes the Establishment Clause as protecting "secular liberty" (not "religious liberty").40 This is a far cry from those who
understood religious freedom as willing obedience to the sovereignty of God, and gave it pride of place in our First Amendment.
The shift from liberalism-as-limited-government to liberalism-as-ideology has been both obscured and exacerbated by the
pretense that it is merely being "neutral" among competing
conceptions of the good life. Somehow, "neutral" came to mean
"secular9'-as if agnosticism about the theistic foundations of
the universe were common ground among believers and nonbelievers alike. Religion (like other direct human experiences) is
unverifiable and unfalsifiable, and secular liberals naively
believed that this distinguished it from other ways of thinking
about the world, which were assumed to be free of this
epistemological flaw. Secular, "objective," reasoning was the
neutral starting point; any religious reasoning was "controversial," "subjective," and-in
public matters-inappropriate.
Thus, in any controversy in which secular liberals sought to
include one book in the curriculum and remove another, while
their religious opponents sought to remove that book and include the other, it was always the latter who were said to be
"interjecting" their beliefs into the curriculum.41 The secular
37.
Id.
38.
See the briefs filed in support of the respondent in Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). For a description of the materials in controversy, see id.
at 897-903 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Powell, J.).
39.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (quoting Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (quoting BERNARDBAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE L?+MERICANREVOLUTION265 (1967))).
Cases in which secular liberals successfully sought removal of books over
41.
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liberals were being neutral and nonsectarian-no matter how
offensive and unfounded their choice of curriculum might seem
to persons of a different mindset.

B. Toleration As Indifference
A parallel development was that liberalism came to be
associated with the idea that individuals have no legitimate
interest in the attitudes, opinions, and character of others within the community. Thus, the state was limited in its power over
the individual conscience not because conscience is too important to brook government control, but because the consciences
of others do not affect our lives. Jefferson could say that "it
does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty
gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my
leg,"" without finding it necessary to distinguish between his
interests as a citizen and his interests as a person. However, to
the evangelical Christians who spearheaded the drive for religious liberty in the United States, such a distinction was allimportant. They could agree that the state should stay out of
the business of saving souls, but it mattered deeply and intensely what their neighbors believed. That was why the evangelicals spent so much time evangelizing. That was the spirit of
the Great Awakening.
The problem with the proposition that the individual is not
affected in any serious way by the character and beliefs of
others is that it is manifestly not true. Obviously we are affected by such issues of character as whether our neighbors a r e
racists, sexists, respectful of the environment, tolerant, industrious, or civil. We have no hesitation today in using state
power to inculcate beliefs and attitudes that we deem important to our life together. We do not wait until bad attitudes and
antisocial principles "break out into overt acts against peace

religious protests include Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992) (upholding the removal of two books, THE BIBLE IN
PICTURESand THE STORY OF JESUS
from a classroom library), and Coleman v.
Caddo Parish School Board, No. 385,230 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Parish, La.,
1993) (ordering removal of abstinence-based sex education curricula entitled "Sex
Respect" and "Racing Reality" from public schools). Cases in which religious and
traditionalist parents unsuccessfully sought removal of books over liberal protests
include Board of Education v. Pico, 457 US. 853 (1982), and Smith v. Board of
School Commissioners, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
42.
THOMASJEFFERSON,
159 William Peden
NOTESON THE STATEOF VIRGINIA
ed., 1955) (1787).
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and good order."43 We design our curricula and redesign our
institutions to bring about desired changes in attitude. This
has created the strange phenomenon of modem liberalism: a
liberalism that still proclaims its neutrality toward competing
ideas of virtue and the good life, but is committed in practice to
the promotion of particular ideals and-even more-to the
eradication of others. In practice, liberals are neutral only
about matters toward which they are indifferent."
Fortunately, modern liberals are usually indifferent toward
religion, a t least as long as it stays in its place. Thus, there can
be widespread agreement that members of the Native American Church should be permitted to ingest peyote in the privacy
of their distant hogansp5 and even that practitioners of
Santeria should enjoy no less freedom to kill animals than
hunters already enjoy? But when churches stand against
principles or interests with more popular currency-when they
forbid interracial dating in their schools4' or refuse to employ
mothers with small children outside the home4'-they
are
unanimously rebuffed by the Supreme Court and scarcely a
voice is lifted on their behalf. Even before the recent shift in
~ exercise casinterpretation of the Free Exercise C l a u ~ e ; free
es were almost always losers: virtually any plausible public
purpose was deemed sufficient to override the right of religious
exercise." If religious freedom is confined to those aspects of
our practice that are of no interest or concern to our neighbors,
it does not amount to much.

43.
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, supra note 26, # 1.
44.
This is what Stanley Fish calls his first law of tolerance dynamics: "Tolerance is exercised in a n inverse proportion to there being anything a t stake." Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posnefs Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1447, 1466 (1990).
45.
An impressive array of civil liberties organizations and academics (including
this author) joined in support of a petition for rehearing in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46.
A similarly impressive array of civil liberties organizations joined in an
amicus curiae brief (written by this author) in support of the petitioners in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
47.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
48.
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1987).
49.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
50.
See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (1990).
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C. The End Of Limited Government
The third important development is that liberalism ceased
to be understood as standing for limited government. Welfarestate liberalism has so eclipsed Lockean liberalism that the
latter is no longer even denominated "liberalism" in common
speech. With the rise of the welfare-regulatory state, the
spheres of religion and government were no longer distant and
distinct (with the government in charge of commerce and civil
order and the churches in charge of charity and the inculcation
of goodness and truth); the state extended its regulatory jurisdiction over broad aspects of life that formerly had been private
and frequently religious, creating conflicts both with religious
institutions and with the religiously motivated activity of individuals. The government could regulate the church itself: whom
it could hire:' for what hours and at what salary," what internal rules it could enforce,s3what it could teach the children
of its believers,s4 and so forth. As government expands, conflicts between religious and public values proliferate.
It should be remembered that when the ~ i r sAmendment
t
was proposed and ratified, the government had little or no
involvement in education, social welfare, or the formation and
transmission of culture. These functions were predominantly
left to the private sphere, and within the private sphere religious institutions played a leading role. As the government has
assumed wider and wider responsibility for the funding and
regulation of these functions, the idea of a "secular state" has
become more and more ominous. When the state is the dominant influence in the culture, a "secular state" becomes equivalent to a secular culture. Religious influences are confined to
those segments of society in which the government is not inEEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.
51.
1981), cert. denied, 456 US. 905 (1982). But see Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a statutory
exemption that permits churches to hire from within their faith, for functions that
are nonprofit in nature). Previously, the Free Exercise Clause protected churches to
some degree in this area, see Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986), but it
is doubtful that this protection survived Smith.
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
52.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Guinn v. Church of
53.
Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
54. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, app.
dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).
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volved, which is to say that religion is confined to the margins
of public life-to those areas not important enough to have
received the helping or controlling hand of government.
Nowhere is this development more evident than in the
field of education. It is no accident that a large proportion of all
religion cases in the Supreme Court have involved schools, for
the takeover of education by the government has been the most
profound cultural change in American history. At the Founding, almost all education-primary,
secondary, and higher-was under religious auspices. Harvard, Yale, Princeton,
William and Mary, Amherst, Williams-all
were Christian
institutions in substance as well as in name through much of
the nineteenth Century and in some cases into the twentieth.
As late as the 1840s, Tocqueville reported that almost all lower
schools were taught by ministers of the gospel.55 I t was only
in the 1840s that government-operated schools gained a monopoly on public funding in the large cities (after tumultuous controversy between the Protestant elite and the largely Catholic
immigrant classes, who fought vainly for a pluralistic educational system). By the close of the century, government-operated schools dominated the field of basic education, the only
holdouts being the Catholic schools and a scattering of Jewish,
Dutch Reformed, Lutheran, Quaker, and upper-class private
schools.
Moreover, educational reformers were more than willing to
use their new-found control over the education of the youth to
inculcate a cultural ideal, often called by nineteenth-century
reformers "Americanism," based on democratic patriotism,
liberal Protestantism, and the virtues of hard work, self-discipline, and self-reliance. Through education the liberal reformers would assimilate the millions of newer immigrants, frequently Catholics and Jews, into the American way of life,
which included a reasonable, non-sectarian, watered-down,
Protestant religion. This was accomplished over the objections
of not just Catholics and Jews, but of more traditional evangelical Protestants, none of whom could understand why "public"
schools should be dominated by the values and ideology of only
one segment of the p ~ p u l a t i o n . ~ ~

55.
DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 33, at 295 n.4.
56.
For descriptions of these struggles, see CHARLESL. GLENN,JR., THE MYTH
OF THE COMMON
SCHOOL (1988); DIANERAVITCH,THE GREATSCHOOLWARS,
NEW
YORKCITY, 1805-1973: A HISTORYOF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS BATTLEFIELDOF
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More recently, twentieth century educational reformers
have pursued the same project in a more secular hue, no less
offensive to traditionalist Catholics, Protestants, and Jews but
lacking the overt connection to liberal Protestantism. John
Dewey, for example, contended that the public schools have a n
"ethical responsibility" to inculcate social values derived from
scientific and democratic principles and to convert children
away from the superstitions of their families.57 Bruce
Ackerman argues that a goal of "liberal education" is "to provide the child with cultural materials" in her resistance to
parental values so that she "may forge the beginnings of a n
identity that deviates from parental norms."58 Unlike Dewey,
Ackerman does not claim that the new "values" are better or
more "scientific" than the old, but maintains that this is a
"neutral" way to build liberal citizens who will think for themselves. A genuinely neutral education would, of course, work
both ways-undermining the unbelief of the unbeliever as well
a s the belief of the believer. Ackerman, however, does not appear to have considered the possibility that the schools be used
to "provide the child with cultural materials" to overcome the
lack of values in the home, nor does he advocate mandatory
religious education for the children of atheist parents.5g The
most recent trend is to use the school for the inculcation of
what is called "multi-culturalism," which in practice is not
multi-cultural at all, but simply another distinct ideological
position hostile to the traditional culture. Education increasingly seems to promote a new set of values no less sectarian than
the old: environmentalism, safe sex, opposition to whatever is
thought to be racism and sexism, sexual freedom, and a critical
posture toward the role of the West in the oppression of the
rest of the world.
It should be obvious to anyone who ponders the matter
SOCIALCHANGE(1974); Michael W. M c c o ~ e u ,Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism,
and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?,
1991 U. CHI. LEGALF. 123, 134-39.
57.
JOHN DEWEY,MORALPRINCIPLES
IN EDUCATION
7-10 (1975).
SOCIAL JUSTICEIN THE LIBERALSTATE 153 (1980).
BRUCEA. ACKERMAN,
58.
I do not imply that such affirmative teaching would be either possible or
59.
desirable. What "values" should the schools inculcate? What religion should they
teach? Who should decide? If Ackerman were genuinely concerned about neutrality,
he would be forced to grapple with these issues, for while undermining the affirmative teachings of the home is easy, introducing serious moral and religious alternatives is far more d=cult. Ackerman, however, is silent about this. His "neutrality" seems purely negative and destructive.
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that education cannot possibly be "neutral" toward all competing points of view. Which historical figures should be profiled
as "role models" in our textbooks? Columbus? Jefferson? Sitting
Bull? Robert E. Lee? Brigham Young? Malcolm X? Sara
Weddington? Mother Theresa? How do we teach biology? Creationism either is,60 or it is not:'
a n intellectually respectable challenge to Darwinian evolution. To include the
creationist challenge is to give it legitimacy; to exclude it is to
privilege the Darwinian orthodoxy and to shelter it from critical evaluation. How do we teach about sex? To some, sexual
modesty and shame are bulwarks against immorality; to others, sexual modesty and shame are obstacles to premeditated
contraception. The first task of sex education is to break down
that sense of shame so that teenagers will feel comfortable
about discussing, procuring, and using contraceptives: that is
why sex education is so controversial. We do not know whether
to teach virtue or not, and we do not know what virtues to
teach. Love, faithfulness, and obedience? Or autonomy and selfa~sertion?~'Which is immoral: homosexuality or the belief
that homosexuality is immoral?
The answer, in modern liberal America, is that these issues will be fought out in the political and professional arenas
and the dominant factions will win-except that religiously
oriented viewpoints are excluded from the outset. In t h e marketplace of ideas, only those tainted by religion are, from the
outset, denied a place.
Studies by the National Institute for Education, People for
the American Way, Americans United for Separation Between
Church and State, and the Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development have been surprisingly uniform in
their finding that religion has been systematically excluded
from the public school curriculum, including such subjects as
history, social studies, and humanities, where it unquestionably plays a part.63 Educational psychologist Paul Vitz, who
60.
DARWINON TRIAL(1991).
See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON,
61.
See generally PHILIP KTTCHER, ABUSINGSCIENCE:THE CASE AGAINSTCREDEFENDED:
A GUIDETO THE EVOLUATIONISM (1982); MICHAELRUSE, DARWINISM
TION CONTROVERSIES
(1982).
62.
See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights":A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 467-68 (1992) ("[Slelfsacrifice is often women's sin . . . . A woman's greatest temptation is to hide her
talents rather than develop them, sacrificing her development as an autonomous
self in order to serve others.").
63.
0.L. DAVIS, JR., ET AL., LOOKINGAT HISTORY:A REVIEWOF MAJOR U.S.
'
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conducted the most comprehensive such study of elementary
and secondary school curricula, concluded:
public school textbooks commonly exclude the history, heritage, beliefs, and values of millions of Americans. Those who
believe in the traditional family are not represented. Those
who believe in free enterprise are not represented. Those
whose politics are conservative are almost unrepresented.
Above all, those who are committed to their religious tradition-at the very least as an important part of the historical
record-are not repre~ented?~

One can go through elementary and secondary school today and
not be aware that religion has played-and still plays-a major
role in history, philosophy, science, and the ordinary lives of
many millions of Americans. I sense the effect in my own elementary school-age children: they wonder how I can think God
and Jesus Christ are so important to the workings of nature
and history when they never hear about such things in school.
A secular school does not necessarily produce atheists, but it
produces young adults who inevitably think of religion as extraneous to the real world of intellectual inquiry, if they think
of religion at all.
Liberal neutrality, it turns out, is of a very peculiar sort.
And what has occurred in education has also occurred, perhaps
less brazenly, in other areas of life that have come under government control. The government sphere is rarely overtly hostile to religion. But by its silence, coupled with its receptivity t o
competing secular ideologies, the government has become a
major factor in the secularization of society.
That is where liberalism brought us. What does post-modernism have to say t o this situation?
OR AGGRAVANT?
IV. POST-MODERNISM:
CORRECTIVE

Post-modemism is more a congeries of attitudes and ideologies than it is a single, coherent philosophical position. It has
usefully been defined as embodying four interrelated concepts:
HISTORY
TEXTBOOKS
3-4, 11 (1987); CHARLES
C. HAYNEs, A TEACHER'S
GUIDE:
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
IN AMERICA
6 (1986); PAULC. VlTZ, RELIGION
AND TRADITIONAL
TEICI'BOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY3-7 (1985); Educators
VALUESIN PUBLIC SCHOOL
Urge Turn to Studies About Religion, N.Y.TIMES,July 2, 1987, at A16 (report of
the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development).
64.
PAUL C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP:
EVIDENCE
OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S
TEXTBOOKS 22 (1986).
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(1)The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating entity; it is purely a social, cultural, historical, and
linguistic creation. ( 2 ) There are no foundational principles
from which other assertions can be derived; hence, certainty
as the result of either empirical verification or deductive reasoning is impossible. (3) There can be no such thing as knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always belief
and can apply only to the context within which it is asserted.
(4) Because language is socially and culturally constituted, it
is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to
reality; hence all propositions and all interpretations,. even
texts, are themselves social construction^.^^

For present purposes, the central insight of post-modernism is
the exposure of liberalism a s just another ideology. What postmodernists have taught us is that the supposed neutrality
often claimed for liberalism is really only a mask for a system
and a way of life that now seems to post-modernists to be
based upon patriarchal, white, male, European, and bourgeois
interests and values. There is no neutral, objective vantage
point from which to view the world; we are all prisoners of our
own perspectives; the beginning of wisdom is to recognize the
potential worth and value of others different from ourselves.
In this sense, advocates of religious freedom should find
much to commend in post-modernism? If "what we think of
a s knowledge is always belief," then religion can reenter the
serious world of intellectual inquiry on a presumptively equal
footing-one belief against another, and let's see which offers
the most persuasive account of the human experience-not
because its status has improved, but because its positivist corn-

65.
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications
for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992). For a more
extensive examination of the meaning of post-modernism, see CHARLESJENCKS,
WHATIS POST-MODERNISM?
(1986).
66.
I do not mean that adherents to traditional biblical religion should (or
could) find post-modernism congenial as a philosophical proposition. The denial of
any objective basis for knowledge seems incompatible with the belief in a God who
has revealed Himself to mankind, and the denial of the objectivity of any text
seems incompatible with the view that the scriptures can be the perfect guide to
faith and practice. My point is simply that a world dominated by post-modernists
might be thought less likely to treat religious modes of thinking as outside the
bounds of reasonable discourse, since post-modernists believe there are no such
bounds. On the prospects for a postmodern theology, see Nancy Murphy & James
W. McClendon, Jr., Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies, 5 MODERN
THEOLOGY
191 (1989).
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petitors have been stripped of their epistemological advantage.
Given its message that secular liberalism is no longer entitled
to a privileged place on account of its ostensible neutrality,
post-modernism would appear to augur a revitalization of religious freedom. In a post-modernist world, maybe religious ways
of thought could be restored to legitimacy and cease to be
r n a r g i n a l i ~ e dAs
. ~ ~Professor Fred Gedicks has stated:
If this post-modern insight is correct, then secularism
has no exclusive claim as the language of American public
life. Public religious discourse was discredited a s arbitrary
subjectivity by a secular critique that pretends to be neutral
and objective, but which beneath that pretense is itself arbitrary and subjective. There can no longer be any empirical
argument for keeping religious discourse out of public life.68

Why, then, does it seem not to work out that way? Why is
it that most of the post-modernist movements that we see i n
law-critical legal studies, feminism, critical race theory and so
forth-seem by and large in their actual political activity to be
hostile and detrimental to religious freedom? Post-modernism,
it turns out, represents not just a critique of liberalism but an
intensification and exacerbation of the very features of liberalism that created the conflict with freedom of religion.
A. The Attack On The Public-Private Distinction
If welfare state liberalism supplanted the earlier understanding of liberalism as limited government, post-modernism
takes us a n additional step. Post-modernism tells us that the
very distinction between the public and the private is incoherent and destructive. A common feature of the post-modern
jurisprudential movements is the attack on the public-private
distinction, especially as it bears upon the constitutional doctrine of state actiodg If the contours of "the private sphere"

67.
One sees this, at times, in Stanley Fish. See Stanley Fish, Liberalism
Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997.
68.
Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20
CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 137 (1991); see also Charles Davis, Religion and the Making
of Society, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 718, 729 (1987) (arguing, on post-modernist grounds,
that religion "is a critical foundation for the permanent argument that constitutes
political society").
69.
See, e-g., Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-45; Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
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(for example, private property) are socially constructed, then
any decision by the state to protect "the private9'-or even to
leave it alone-is a political decision; it is "state action." If the
state chooses to allow a private club t o discriminate (when it
could just as easily forbid the discrimination), that is "state
action." If a poor person starves, it is not the result of impersonal forces but of the state's failure to redistribute resources.
If the state fails t o prevent domestic violence (perhaps because
of a misguided respect for the "privacy" of the home) it is a
social failure.
Yet the public-private distinction (the state action doctrine)
is utterly indispensable to a theory of religious freedom. We
cannot have religious freedom without it. The very same conduct can be either constitutionally protected or constitutionally
forbidden, depending on whether those who engage in it are
acting in their "private" or their "public" capacities. If a group
of people get together and form a church, that is the free exercise of religion. If the government gets together and forms a
church, that is an establishment of religion. One is protected;
one is forbidden. It is inconceivable that we could construct a
theory of freedom of religion which does not distinguish at
some level between the activities of the individual believer and
the activities of the sovereign.
for
' exIn Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. A n o ~ , ~
ample, the government made an exception to its employment
discrimination laws allowing churches to hire members of their
own faith. This was challenged as an establishment of religion,
but the Court upheld it. The pre-post-modernist majority naively asserted that a "law is not unconstitutional simply because it
allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must
be fair t o say that the government itself has advanced religion
Justice O'Connor,
through its own activities and infl~ence."~~
evidently influenced by post-modernist thinking, explained that
this analysis seemed

1497 (1983);Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1195-1206(1985);Symposium on The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U . PA. L. REV.
1289 (1982). For an earlier statement of the position, applied to religion, see KARL
IMARX, On the Jewish &uestion, in 3 KARL MARX,FREDERICK
ENGELS,COLLECTED
WORKS146, 160-68 (International Publishers 1975).
70.
483 US.327 (1987).
71. Id. at 337.
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to obscure far more than to enlighten. Almost any government
benefit to religion could be recharacterized as simply
"allowing" a religion to better advance itself. . . . The Church
had the power to [force its employees to conform to the church
or lose their jobs] because the Government had lifted from
religious organizations the general regulatory burden imposed
by [the civil rights

This is a restatement of the familiar deconstruction of the public-private distinction. If there is no difference between government "lifting a regulatory burden" (that is, not interfering with
private action) and government conferring an affirmative benefit, then there is no difference, in principle, between guaranteeing the free exercise of religion and erecting an establishment.
Less obviously, but to the same effect, Justice Breman
argued that the Amos case presented a "confrontation between
the rights of religious organizations and those of individua l ~ . " ' This,
~
too, is a denial of the force of the public-private
distinction. It treats as equivalent "rights" the freedom of a
religious community to choose for itself who its agents are t o
be, and the "right" of an outsider to invoke the coercive power
of the state to force the religious community to hire him. It
presupposes that an individual's "rights" run equally against
public and private institutions.
Once the public-private distinction is obliterated-once
private power and public power are treated as equally threatening and once the government is understood to act whenever
it refrains from interfering with the acts of private individuals-religious freedom cases become hopelessly indeterminate.
Thus, Justice O'Connor is forced to decide the Amos case on the
72.
Id. at 347 (O'Comor, J., concurring in the judgment). This argument was
echoed by Professor Mark Tushnet, the leading Critical Legal Studies theorist in
the field of religious freedom: "One might respond, of course, that the government
indeed put the Church in a position to put [the employee] to that choice by relieving the Church of its obligation to comply with the general antidiscrimination requirement." Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1705 (1988). Tushnet's interjection, "of course,"
shows just how obvious post-modernist thinking now seems to post-modernists.
Non-post-modernists might be tempted to respond that "of course" Tushnet's statement presupposes, incorrectly, that the government has the rightful authority to
impose a legal obligation on the Church to hire unbelievers.
73. Amos, 483 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This
argument, too, was echoed by Professor Tushnet. Tushnet, supra note 72, at 1705
("Accommodating one interestthat o f . . . the employee in Amos-necessarily
impairs the same religious interest on the other side").

186

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

basis of a n utterly contentless "endorsement test" (the Religion
Clauses' equivalent of "we know it when we see it"),74 and
Justice Brennan is forced to give precedence to institutional
over individual free exercise rights-which might be correct,
but is hardly self-evident and which, under the majority approach, is unnecessary to decide.

B. Tolerance And The Debunking Of Neutrality
A second reason that modem liberalism ceased to be consistent with a robust notion of religious liberty was that liberalism turned out not to be merely a neutral arbiter among competing understandings of the good life, but to embody certain
substantive principles, among them individualism, independence, and rationality. Now that has been unmasked by postmodernists. What happens next?
For the most part, with some exceptions, post-modernists
i n the legal and political arenas have treated the debunking of
liberal neutrality as a n opportunity for partisanship in the
service of a controversial vision of liberation. As one academic
commentator on post-modernism has observed:
Many [post-modernists] are political activists and political
advocates. They adopt positive political positions based on
explicitly stated values and goals. They move from
deconstruction and reconstruction to construction, despite the
intellectual logical contradiction involved in denying modern
foundations and then positing one's own vision as in some
ways ''better."75

Thus, while multi-culturalism and political correctness may
seem to be logically incompatible positions, they often are
found in the same people. The logical path seems to be as fob
lows: If there is no objective standard of truth, there is no need
to worry that opposing viewpoints might have something important to say; and since there is no basis for persuasion by the
intrinsic merit of argument, all that is left is the exercise of
74.
For demonstrations that the "endorsement" test has no determinative content, see Michael W. McCo~ell,Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 148-51 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment NeutmliQ and the 970 Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REV.266 (1987); see also William P. Marshall, We Rizow It When We See It": The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.495 (1986).
PAULINEM. ROSENAU,POST-MODERNISM
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:IN75.
SIGHTS, INROADS,AND INTRUSIONS
145 (1992).
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power. So t h e post-modernist advocate pleads for
openmindedness t o various points of view (multi-culturalism)
when out of power and suppresses dissent (political correctness) when in power.
This is the phenomenon of selective multi-culturalism:
boundless tolerance and respect for some voices, and ruthless
suppression of others. Religion is a n especially vulnerable target because religion represents the wisdom of the ages, which
is a n obstacle to the transformation of society. With respect to
the great post-modern concerns of sexuality, race, and gender,
the advocates of social change are anything but indifferent
toward the teachings of traditional religion-and since they are
not indifferent they are not tolerant. Thus, feminists and gayrights activists appear to feel no hesitation in using government power to force recalcitrant believers to change their evil
ways. Churches, for example, should be forced to hire female
priests and gay ministers, even if that is contrary to their own
A public school should be used, i n
religious com~nitrnent.~~
Kathleen Sullivan's words, to "inculcate commitments to gender
equality that are incompatible" with traditional interpretations
of the Bible.?? Parents are stripped of the right to withdraw
their children from sex education programs that are offensive
to their religion or moral code." Catholic hospitals are forced
to teach their medical students to perform abortion^.'^ Many
post-modernists have ceased to value freedom in its own right,
but only as a means of promoting their own substantive ends.
Thus, according to one feminist legal scholar, the Free Exercise
Clause was a mistake, because "religion perpetuates and reinforces women's subordination, and religious freedom impedes
Even the unmasking of liberal neutrality has been selective. It is recognized that the liberal tradition was patriarchal
and Euro-centric, but rarely is it pointed out that liberalism is
76.
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also secular. Indeed, post-modernists find it convenient to keep
in place some of the intellectually discredited doctrinal baggage
of liberalism when the issue is religion. The great exemplar of
this phenomenon is Professor Mark Tushnet, a Critical Legal
Studies scholar of great distinction and an authority on the
question of religion under the First Amendment. Tushnet is the
first to expose and deconstruct the seeming neutrality of the
common law of property or contract; but when it comes to supposedly neutral laws that impinge on the practice of religion,
Tushnet has resurrected the most formalistic of position^.^'
According to Tushnet, a law that imposes the same secular
standards on the religious and the non-religious alike is neutral toward religion. This is a defensible position to take on
some jurisprudential grounds (though I disagree with it), but it
is surprising, to say the least, to hear it from the mouth of a
Critical Legal Scholar.
The effect of selective post-modernism is t o allow secular
ideologies to use political muscle to advance their causes, including using the public schools to inculcate their ideals, without even the psychological constraint of liberal neutrality, but
at the same time to preserve liberal formalism in court to ensure that religion is not included in the public dialogue. Thus,
in New York City the children are read Heather Has Two
Mommies in the first grade and given information on anal
intercourse in the sixthf2 but, as the Tenth Circuit recently
held, The Bible in Pictures must be removed from the shelf of
the ffith grade classroom library.83

"God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!"
If you dispute that fact, you have the inalienable right to sing,
weep, laugh, and mumble, so long as you do it in private. That
is the freedom of religion in the post-modern age.
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